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Monitoring Elections
Padraig O'Malley

member of international delegations monitoring elections
South Africa, and Mozambique. These delegations were organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), WashPadraig O'Malley was a
in the Philippines,

and

ington, D.C. O'Malley' s opinions, observations,

own and

are entirely his

During

in

no way

the past ten years,

reflect the

have taken part

I

reflections on these elections

opinions of NDI.

in

a number of international observer

missions to elections in various parts of the world. This evening

about these

in particular

— the Philippine elections
Mozambican

election in April 1994; and the

whether there are features
practices have evolved in

The Philippine
reasons,
the

I

think.

common
new

elections

First,

to all

want

I

to talk

February 1986; the South African

elections in

and unique

directions since the

were the

in

to

November 1994

—

to see

each and whether monitoring

end of the Cold War.

achieve celebrity status, for a number of

first to

they represented the impact of the globalization of the

media were the message, and the

fact of

nature and context of the elections themselves. Second,
pitting a longtime aging dictator

who,

let it

media

—

an election being observed changed the

be

said,

it

was a high-profile

had achieved legendary

—

election,
status in

homely housewife, Cory Aquino
widow of
1983 by agents of Marcos as he stepped off a
returning from a number of years in exile to avenge her dead husplane in Manila
band. Third, and perhaps more important in the long run, was that the democracy
movement was beginning to take shape in the mid-1980s, and many authoritarian dictatorships were being challenged for the first time by a variety of pro-democracy movements and nongovernmental organizations committed to the development of functioning

many

parts of his country, against a

Benigno Aquino, a man murdered

in

—

civil societies.

One -party states were beginning to come under critical scrutiny from within their
own countries, and voices calling for multiparty electoral systems were being heard for
the

first

time.

Typically, an election monitor is responsible for assuring that the elections are car-

ried out in accordance with the electoral

independent electoral commission (IEC).

code or the election laws established by an

An IEC

has the overall responsibility for ad-

ministering the election, for ensuring that the elections are violence-free and without
intimidation, for convincing the voters that their votes will

be cast

in secrecy, for carry-

ing out the counting of the votes, and for being the final arbiter in decisions regarding

votes or groups of votes

ample, an

X

head of the

had

to

party.

whose

validity has

been challenged. In Mozambique, for ex-

be placed beside the symbol of the party or the photograph of the

Even [check marks] in the appropriate boxes were, under the election
was no doubt as to how the voter intended to vote. And in

laws, invalid, although there
the end, an

IEC has

the responsibility to judge whether or not the election

Padraig O'Malley is a senior fellow at the John W.
University of Massachusetts Boston.
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Mozambique

South Africa

\

.

free, as

does the monitor. All

in all,

daunting tasks, especially

Mozambique, where

Philippines and

in

countries such as the

the supporting infrastructure

is

largely absent,

administrative capacity sadly lacking, and widespread corruption rampant at both the
official

and unofficial

life rather

levels,

which

is,

by the way,

I

will distinguish

between

Retail fraud takes place at the election

2.

—

a

way of

than an exception.

For the moment,

1

largely taken for granted

retail

site. It

and wholesale fraud.

includes:

Multiple voting: bringing votes from one district to another.
Multiple voting by the individual.

As

way of addressing this, it has over
mark the back of

a

the years been the practice of election administrators to
the of the

3.

hand or a finger of each voter with an

often the dyes are tampered with and in

many

Helping the old or the

and

illiterate to vote,

should add that each party usually

is

indelible dye.

However,

cases can be easily erased.

in effect voting

entitled to

for them.

have a number of

its

I

own

monitors present in the ballot area. They are in a position to monitor the
actions of the voting authorities and of individual voters and subsequently to

challenge their actions.
4.

The issuance offalse ID cards. Making credible duplicates of voter ID cards
common practice over the years, and degrees of misuse vary

has been a

depending upon whether voters have

ID card
5.

to preregister to vote or

Hampering people's

ability to vote

by supplying them with incorrect

mation regarding balloting procedures. In most countries
democratic elections for the
are illiterate. For
zations,

whether any

will suffice.

some time

first

infor-

that are holding

time, many, and often most, of the voters

prior to the elections, nongovernmental organi-

sometimes the country's IECs, which are

often, even if unfairly so,

regarded as a government rubber stamp, and international organizations that
specialize in election monitoring, carry out voter education programs
try to

how

to vote. In this case,

days of the elections
it

6.

which

extend the rudiments of the democratic process and educate voters

is

you could say

difficult for voter education

states

where

come

interchangeable.

that the monitoring itself

on the

the last step in a long and arduous process.

programs

is

Making

easy, especially in one-party

the state and the party have, for

all

intents

and purposes, be-

is the presence of an independent medium, especially
a lesser extent radio. Television is invariably state-owned

Often absent, as well,
television

and

to

and during state elections is used in a blatantly partisan way. Part of the
problem here is that opposition parties do not object since they, too, if they
were in power, would behave similarly. Using the machinery of the state to
influence elections

Which

is

routinely regarded as one of the perks of incumbency.

raises an important point: election monitoring has taken on a

ippine elections as a benchmark. Monitoring

is

much broader

would probably use the Philmuch more concerned now with all

frame of reference over the past several years, and again

I

aspects of the electoral process that contributes to an unequal playing field and with the

elimination of barriers which contribute to that inequality. Leveling the playing field
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now

the phrase of the day,

and

that

means ensuring

the conditions for voter education

programs, overseeing voter registration drives, evaluating the media for equal coverage,
guaranteeing equal access to the paraphernalia of elections, including consultation in

drawing up the ballot

how

itself,

and agreements on what demarcation on the ballot will be

and verification processes
main counting centers, procedures
for counting and for dealing with vote challenges, and reconciliation procedures to
confirm that the number of votes cast at the ballot boxes is equal to the number of votrequired,

ballots are regarded as being valid; procedures

for ballot boxes, ensuring their transportation to the

ers verified to

have been admitted

to the polling station.

Wholesale fraud takes two forms, and many variations

Among

the variations: seals

within the ambit of both.

fall

on ballot boxes are tampered with, fraudulent ballots are

inserted and the real contents

dumped;

added

ballot boxes full of fraudulent votes are

to

the tally; ballot boxes are lost; ballot boxes materialize out of cyberspace; pirate ballot
stations operate.

And most

massive scale and

more

is

serious, perhaps because

it

can be carried out on a more

sophisticated and difficult to detect,

is

through which electoral data are altered to produce fraudulent

computer

fixing,

tallies.

In keeping with the advancing technologies of electoral processes, wholesale
retail fraud

today are

much more

difficult to carry out

and

because of the evolution of more

sophisticated parallel counts or quick counts, as they are often called.
In the remainder of

my

talk, I will

argue that in the post-Cold

War

the function of election monitoring has been altered drastically, that
tion is not to ensure a free
to ensure that the results

and

fair election, as

produce a government

election and the electorate as being legitimate,

macy

in turn

produces political

making the

tries

transition

produce a free and

we

stability.

fair result

per

se,

by the parties to the
acknowledgment of legiti-

that is regarded

and

that the

elections, especially in coun-

states to a multiparty

its

not to

is

institutions will slowly

way

for party building, capacity building, institution building,

trust

among

who

democracy,

but to lay the groundwork for developing a sustain-

able democracy, so that a form of government and

the major actors

primary func-

define that in the classical sense, but

The purpose of

from one-party

order of things,

its

facilitate

pave the

and the development of

accommodation and compromise among the

parties.

Democracy
tices

is

a learned behavior. In formerly one-party states, undemocratic prac-

must be unlearned. This does not happen overnight, but

is

a slow, painstaking

process requiring constant attention and a vigorous, vocal civil society to back

Some

other useful observations provide a subtext for evaluating the

work of

it

tional monitoring agencies.

no "ideal" democratic system.

1.

There

2.

Democracy cannot

is

flourish without the

development of

trust, tolerance,

and

a willingness to compromise.
3.

Democracy

is

about behavior, behavior

are rooted in values, convictions

can be learned

—

or, as is

is

based on convictions, convictions

and values can be taught, and behaviors

necessary in

many

cases, behavior can be un-

learned.
4.

Many

African countries were handicapped at the outset.
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up.

interna-

.

5.

The globalization of communications reinforces the trends of democratization. The fax and the cellular phone are the latest instruments of communication
technology to shape the way in which elections are conducted, especially in
countries lacking electricity.

Although a transition

6.

is

singular to a particular country, transitions, whether

from authoritarian or military or communism

to

democracy, share many

features.
7.

Democracy

8.

Expectations must be kept in check.

9. In

many

not edible.

is

cases,

democracy

the

is

remedy of

last resort.

Refugee problems undermine democratization.

10.

Questions of ethnicity and tribalism are being more openly acknowledged

1 1

and do not seem

to elicit the suspicion or defensiveness they

once engen-

dered.
12. In

most underdeveloped countries, there

is

a very limited understanding of

the role of a public broadcasting system in a democratic society.
13.

A

Code of Conduct, to which all parties agree, proved its efficacy during
Namibia elections and can be a very useful ancillary tool.

the 1989

14. International

observer groups have

come

to play a vital role in transitions.

Their presence changes the nature of the process being observed. They both
confer legitimacy and

They

make

it

more

difficult for a ruling

regime

to cheat.

inspire confidence in the process, thus encouraging people to partici-

pate.
15. Internal

monitoring groups play a similar role and have a similar impact.

Churches, in particular, possess the organizational structures to

countrywide monitoring networks. To perform

facilitate

this function effectively,

however, the churches must be seen to be neutral, which

is

often a problem

since they frequently see themselves as part of the larger liberation

move-

ment.
16. In a

world

in

which competition

become more ethnocenmore affluent states discourages altruacknowledgment that over the past

for resources has

than ever, the self-interest of the

tric

ism and foreign

aid.

There

is little

twenty years, authoritarian colonialism, leaving behind administrative structures rather than nation-states,

party states

skewed by

spawned

artificial

authoritarian, autocratic, single-

borders and often antagonistic admixtures

of ethic groups, create in substantial measure the convoluted and
politics that

have emerged

often with the

Let

me

turn

now

in

many

artificial

parts of the world, particularly in Africa,

most heinous consequences.
to specific elections.

I

will give the least time to the Philippines

the most to South Africa for a variety of reasons that

I

hope

will

become

and

apparent.

example of where the new center may be drifting.
Cory Aquino against the malevolent tyrant Ferdinand Marcos, had all the ingredients of a soap opera. This was not
an election about issues but about some mythical bout between Good and Evil, as personified by the two candidates. Cory, the darling of the West, a newfound celebrity as

Mozambique provides a
The Philippine

further

elections in 1986, pitting the poignant
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she returned to the Philippines to oust the

man who many

believed to be her husband's

murderer. There were no issues, as such, beyond the corruption of Marcos's twenty-one

was and remains the issue in the PhilMarcos and Aquinos families come from
positions on the issue were at best perfunctorily dif-

years in office. Indeed, perhaps the one issue that
ippines

is

land reform, and since both the

large land-holding baronies, their
ferent, questions of

nuance rather than substance. What made the Philippine elections

unique was the fact that

namely the

My own

in large

—

measure, was determined by the media

situation at the time will suffice to illustrate the point.

an area in the far south

My

outcome,

its

international media.
I

was monitoring

in

— Nindanamo — supposedly a stronghold of the Communists.

three colleagues and

I

monitored a dozen balloting stations, took frequent sound-

saw the
which ballots were to be
transported to the provincial capital. We followed the boxes and saw them safely to
their destination. All appeared to be in order and, to tell the truth, we were a little disappointed since it is the unstated dream of every election monitor to find massive, largescale fraud that will bring matters to a screeching halt. Back in Manila, where we and
ings from the quick-count people, watched the counting at each of the stations,
parties put their imprints

on the waxed seals of the boxes

the rest of the delegation spent a full day debriefing,

egation had found anything

more

in

few of the

forty or so in the del-

than retail fraud here and there and at

the military stood inside the allowed limits

and appeared

to

some

stations

pose a rather intimidating

presence.

Meanwhile, however,
various reports
abruptly

when

coming
results

state television,

in

from

all

which had been covering the

elections,

had

over the country. The television link was severed

from several areas suggested Aquino was doing better than ex-

pected.

Immediately, panic ensued as delegations began to ring their homes, offices, and

what ABC, CBS, and NBC were reporting, and their reports of vote
became the basis for the conclusion of many delegations, including ours, that
the election was not free and fair. Simply put, we could not reach a conclusion that
might allow for the bad guy's winning. We could not be out of line with what the conventional opinion makers had predicted before the elections: that should Marcos win,
he would have stolen it.
It wasn't until about 2:00 A.M. Sunday morning (January 1986) that conclusive
proof of rigging came in. The computers were cooking the books, which had been
preprogrammed to manipulate the data when it was fed in. No television crew came
upon this, no sleuthing monitor was on the ball. Just a computer operator who blew the
whistle when certain weird results that were counterintuitive began to emerge.
Marcos was greedy. He decided to steal big, thus focusing attention on election data
that otherwise would have been overlooked. Had he stolen small, he probably would
have gotten away with it. One thing for sure: he would not have had to flee the country
in the manner in which he did.
The South African elections had also a lot to do with being on the right side. Any
attempt at overt stealing would have been easily detected since the country was literally
crawling with election monitors, from God knows where, with fleets of television cameras in their wake. In one sense, the results were a foregone conclusion: It was a given
that at the national level Nelson Mandela would easily prevail, the only question being
whether he would get more than the magic two-thirds of the vote that would give him,
in effect, a free hand to draw up the country's final constitution.
friends to find out

rigging

118

There were,
hours

late in

in fact,

delays and irregularities; in

showing up;

in others, ballot stations

some
took

it

places, ballot papers

upon themselves

were

to stay

open

some people

past the 7:00 P.M. closing lime. Because of inefficiency in administration,

stood in line for hours before getting the opportunity to vote. ID cards were easily
forged. Nevertheless, at the end of the voting monitors could only say that the elections

had been violence-free
true),

and despite some

(true), that intimidation

appeared

That, too, was the message of the international media
tors.

to

have been negligible (not so

irregularities, the voting, they concluded,

was

fair

and their respective

and

free.

commenta-

Despite the fact that the counting of votes had barely started, the African National

Congress (ANC) declared victory and a triumphant Nelson Mandela was hailed internationally as president-elect. After three centuries of oppression

and almost

fifty

of the

inhumanity of apartheid, justice was not just done but was seen to be done.

The vote count, however, became a nightmare. Hundreds of ballot boxes were unacfor, millions of votes lost. The ANC accused the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
of vote-rigging in KwaZulu-Natal and the IFP counterattacked with allegations that the
ANC had been involved in voter sabotage. The National Party weighed in with a variety
of complaints about both ANC and IFP practices. The neatly constructed fiction of the
previous days began to unravel. Ominous predictions threatened from the sidelines. And
a desperate independent electoral commission simply stopped counting and gave the
counted

results.

And what

miraculous results they were. Everyone was a winner. Buthelezi and the

IFP won KwaZulu Natal with 50.3 percent of the vote. The National Party (NP) won the
Western Cape, the ANC won majorities in the other seven provincial parliaments, and a
not two-thirds majority in the National Government

—

enough to ensure
would completely dominate the proposed government of national unity.
Thus the "miracle." But let us look at it in a little more detail.
very solid,
that the

•

if

ANC

Record of Understanding signed between the African National
Congress and the National Party in September 1993 signaled that the
transfer of power had begun. From that point on, the ANC and NP
brokered the process
the other parties were left to follow or to

First, the

—

marginalize themselves.
•

The Inkatha Freedom

it would not
KwaZulu-Natal this was of particular
significance, since the political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP in
the region was ferocious, violent, and to a large extent uncontrollable.
In the weeks leading up to the election, as efforts to entice the IFP to

Party, until the last minute, said

participate in the elections. In

become

part of the process increased, violence escalated at exponential

rates in Natal.

Were

ANC

IFP not
by default,

the

to participate in Natal, thus giving the

civil war would occur in Natal, which
would spread along the Eastern Reef. But equally as troubling was the
fact that if the IFP did contest the election and lose in KwaZulu-Natal,
Buthelezi would not accept the results and once again, the specter of
civil war would loom. It was apparent to the leadership of the ANC that
should the IFP fail to win in Natal and scream "fraud," Buthelezi would
reject the legitimacy of the results with all the tumult that would
follow. Indeed, the ANC in the region threatened to go to court to have

province to the

the results invalidated, but the national leadership
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made

a decision:
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— not

better have Buthelezi in the tent

famous adage. The

Mozambique

alternative: civil

Angola/

in Natal, an

scenario that would ensure that

would come

Lyndon Johnson's

to finish

war

— very

little

little

—

way of South Africa. It would only
prove that, as many had predicted, South Africa would go the way of
the rest of Africa. Hence stability became the overriding consideration.
foreign investment

A

the

similar logic applied to the Western Cape, although

colored vote there

swung behind

the NP,

enough

clear

it is

one of the striking ironies of

that the

history:

you side

with your oppressor because, as bad as he has been, you fear that his successor, the
multitude of the oppressed, might be even more oppressive

The "we-all-win"

conveyed legitimacy

result

.

.

.

to the process.

Hence, South Africa could put forward the new South Africa as the model of a

making a successful
Since April 1994,

when

to the

New.

have spoken

to the

from the Old Order

political transition,

the elections took place,

I

state

most senior

people in the African National Congress, the former National Party government, and the

IFP To a person, they deny

that a formal deal

was struck

in a smoke-filled or, probably

these days, a smoke-free room. But, then, on the other hand,

no one

will

deny

that in-

formal understandings emerged, particularly that one set of results would plunge South
Africa into an Angola/Mozambique situation with

would
their

entail.

own

Thus, sharing, allowing

all

all

the horrible consequences that

sides a stake in

positions as pronounced in the past,

winning and a vindication of

would give

the

new governments, both

regional and national, legitimacy. In this sense, a result that produced a stable govern-

ment accepted by the people, that is, a government whose legitimacy was accepted, was
far more important than one which was free and fair.
This trend toward legitimacy and

began

to

emerge

stability, at the

expense of other considerations,

1980s when international monitoring teams would often

in the late

end of the

find themselves at the short

stick

when

the rival political parties that had

fought the elections refused to accept their adjudications and took to boycotting Parlia-

ment or engaging
For the past

in

armed resistance or

thirty years, the

in other

forms of

instability.

United Nations was heavily engaged in electoral

verifi-

cation and the provision of technical electoral assistance in the context of decoloni-

During the past

zation.

own

five years,

however, the

UN has

found

surprise, continuously involved in the business of free

Namibia experience, followed by the UN's success
Nicaragua, created a catalytic effect.

from world events, and the
for the

UN

in electoral verification in Haiti

The democratic

ideal

had received a new

and

vitality

that idea.

major debate began about the standards that the

and the kind of circumstances

somewhat to its
The

fair elections.

has been recognized as a viable operational mechanism

development and support of

In late 1991, a

itself,

and

in

which

national integrity, self-determination,

it

should

become

UN

should uphold,

involved, so as to strengthen

and independence rather than

—

to

undermine them.

The General Assembly adopted an important resolution
Resolution 46/137 of
December 17, 1992
which deals with the various types of UN assistance with regard

—

to the

holding of free and fair elections.

It

emphasizes that

all states

equality and that each state, in accordance with the support of
to truly

choose and develop

its political, social,

It

enjoy a sovereign

people, has the right

economic, and cultural systems.

recognizes that no single political system or electoral method
nations and their peoples.

its

is

It

equally suited to

also

all

recognizes that the efforts of the international community

120

.

to

enhance the effectiveness of the principles of periodic and genuine elections should

not call into question each nation's sovereign rights,
people, freely to choose and develop

its

accordance with the will of

in

political, social,

its

and cultural systems, whether

or not they conform to the preferences of other states.

The assembly

also declared that determining the will of the people requires an elec-

provides

toral process that

and

all

become candidates

citizens with an equal opportunity to

to present their political views.

In

more recent

engage

UN has

years, the

in electoral verification in

1

The

2.

The monitoring of an

situation should

toral

advanced

criteria

an independent

under which

it

undertake to

will

state.

have a clear international dimension.
election or referendum should cover the entire elec-

process in order to secure the conditions of freeness and fairness, and

impartiality.

A UN

3.

presence

process at a critical point in a

in the electoral

state's political

should be sought by the state in question.

life

There should be approval by the component organ of the UN.

4.

As has become increasingly clear over the last several years, however, the UN has
more than a lack of abundant resources. Member-states, now that the Cold War is over,
use the

UN to

give

service to the principles for

lip

advance policies that benefit

to-be-member countries, few

their

own narrow

UN participation

will follow

up with the resources

more than a gesture of impotence.
Problems are compounded when the ruling party

presence

interests,

and while

all

member or aboutrequired to make the UN

in elections in

little

or only agrees to

it

power want an

are not in

takes exception to a

under a great deal of international pressure. The
effective

UN presence

political parties that

monitoring presence. They are profoundly suspicious

of the intention of their governments.
This almost always weakens the position not only of the
monitors. Monitoring, not surprisingly, works best

support to

and

it

it.

It

works

far less well

when

when

UN

all

but of

all

international

parties give their

a dominant government refuses to

works worst when one party or another does not accept the

fulsome

empower

it,

electoral results or the

rulings of internal and external monitoring agencies.

Some

Illustrations

Under

international pressure, President Daniel

National Union

(KANU), scheduled

were the country's
1963.

Many

made

body mandated

solely of

Kenyan African
December 1992. They

leader of the

freely contested elections since independence

from Britain

in

observers, however, were of the opinion that resistance to the process of

democratization
the

first

Arap Moi,

multiparty elections for

free

and

fair elections

to register voters

and

impossible. The Electoral Commission.

to administer the election process, consisted

members nominated by Moi without the advice
The government also refused

tation with, the opposition.

or counsel of, or even consulto involve opposition parties in

formulating rules governing the transitional process. Instead, the

Parliament passed an

amendment which provided

KANU-dominated

that the president

had

to

be elected by

majority vote and by at least 25 percent of the vote in at least five of the country's eight
provinces, an arrangement that gave

Moi

a decided edge. In the elections held on
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New England Journal

December

29,
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1992

,

Moi was

returned to office and

liament. Although fifteen of his twenty-one cabinet

opposition

split

among

three parties,

Moi won

won

a comfortable margin in Par-

members were

defeated, with the

reelection with only 36.7 percent of the

votes (another legacy of the British majoritarian system).

Immediately, citing what they called across-the-board cheating and vote-rigging,

announced that they would not
was a hollow opposition, distinctly lacking people power, and Moi, it could be clearly seen, had absolutely no intention of
stepping down or of holding new elections. Moreover, the specter of civil war prior to
leaders of Kenya's three strongest opposition parties

accept the outcome of the elections. But theirs

the elections' well-armed and organized

members of

the minority Kalenzins, President

Moi's ethnic group, which during his tenure had become the country's dominant

mounted a

series

the Kikuyu, Luo,
ize divisions.

of attacks against largely defenseless

and Luyha. Traditionally

The

international interest

was

in

members of

elite,

larger ethnic groups,

Kenya, ethnic divisions overlap and polar-

clear. Internal unrest in

Kenya would un-

doubtedly escalate into further destabilization in a region already badly fragmented and

Economist reported on February 6, 1993, "International observsome hemming and hawing, decided that the polls were tilted towards Mr. Moi

divided. Hence, as The
ers, after

and

KANU,

Many
Kenyan

but that the results, nevertheless, roughly represented people's will."

Africans were disillusioned with the performance of electoral observers in the

elections. In

an acerbic commentary, Africa Week said:

Despite allegations of poor administration, incidence of rigging and malpractice

and

electoral irregularity, the international monitoring

teams seem unanimously

prepared to accept the election results, despite the fact that they were never free and
fair.

What

is

most remarkable

is that

the positions of the observers have been varied

and often contrary. What the whole process of monitoring has shown
standard that

some of

the observers are prepared to uphold.

is

They seem

the double
to

abandon

the very principles they are supposed to use as yardsticks for determining whether
elections are fair and free.

The

raise crucial questions over the

particular positions taken

by some observers now

involvement of external observers and whether they

have been or can be seen to be impartial.

What

was happening was that the rules of the game were changing, and they
most finely honed moment during the elections in Mozambique when
the government party FRELIMO, led by President Joaquin Chissamo, squared off
against the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), led by Afonso Dhlakama.
Despite the fact that RENAMO pulled out of the election on the first day of balloting, a
third day was added to make up for the lost first day when logistical problems in terms
of getting ballots to polling stations were overwhelming, when different parts of the
country continued to vote into the night on the second day, but only in areas where
there was electricity, when counting took almost three weeks to complete. The results
indicated that Chissamo had beaten Dhlakama, but that the margin of victory for
FRELIMO was less in the National Assembly. Chissamo was prepared to offer a powersharing government of sorts to bring about national reconciliation. Dhlakamo declined
this offer, but more important, he said he would accept the results, ensuring the legitimacy of the government and stability. Only then did international observers declare the
were

in fact

to find their

election to be free

and

fair.
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To wind up,

there

were presidential elections

in fifteen

sub-Saharan Africa countries

between 1990 and 1992. In seven of them, elections were seen as being free and
six countries, the exception being

accepted the results. In four other countries, elections were not seen as free and

incumbents clung

to

to

have been freely and

was

fairly elected

fair,

the

incumbent seen by international

while the opposition vociferously and

violently rejected the results, and every attempt since then to
into

In

power, and the opposition parties did not accept the legitimacy of

the results. In short, in only one state, Angola,

monitors

fair.

Angola, the incumbent was ousted and the opposition

end the

civil

war has run

one roadblock or another.

In six countries the

incumbent was ousted, and

in eight countries the

incumbent was

returned to power under either dubious or fraudulent electoral circumstances. Moreover,

opposition parties accepted the legitimacy of the results only in the six states that

ousted the incumbents, providing an unsettling precedent of sorts:
in

newly formed multiparty democracies, opposition parties

of the electoral results only

if the

incumbent

is

therefore, not barometers of the prospects for a

One

final thought,

countries],

due

from the African writer

to centuries

it

would appear

that

will accept the legitimacy

defeated. Elections in themselves are,

smooth

transition to

Makua wa Mutua:

of abuse and deprivation,

it

democracy.

"[In post-colonial

has been difficult and in

some

cases impossible to develop and sustain practices that enhance and internalize concepts

of a functioning democracy."

5*

This speech was originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994.
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Addendum — January 1999

Paradigm

Shifts?

n a recent column, "No Repeat of Our Glorious 1994," one of South Africa's most

I prominent political commentators,
Many

Kaiser Nyatsumba wrote,

memories of those

will take

their masters, all eager to cast a vote in

Those were probably the most
South Africa

Although
politics

many
large

we

is

on
madams, labourers standing with

special days to their graves. There they were,

April 27 and 28, 1994, maids standing with their

our democratic national elections.

cathartic days in the history of this country.

again facing an election in a matter of months.

will not

be a typically "normal" country for a few more years, our

have nevertheless begun to lose their "special" image. There

in politics

many

today

who

others are there to

any other, and some

may

well be

believe they are there to serve the nation, but by and

will lie

make

a living.

and cheat

to

To them,

remain

politics is an occupation like

in office to reap the benefits of

being in parliaments or government.

A

second observation came from Albie Sachs, one-time

member of the country's Constitutional
we can't achieve the achievable."

When

the Truth and Reconciliation

Court.

"We were

activist

and presently a

able to achieve a miracle, but

Commission (TRC), which was supposed to open
some mysterious alchemy achieve

the floodgates to the horrors of apartheid past and by

reconciliation in South Africa, released

was damned by
Truth,

it

its

all political parties. Its full

did reveal; but

ance. Reconciliation

is

it is

an incomplete

final report at the

truth. Justice

of the report diverted attention from

bility

it

remains very

much

in.

in the bal-

a far cry.

Ironically, the attempt of the African National

operandi of apartheid

end of October 1998,

repercussions are only beginning to sink

itself,

its

more

Congress (ANC)

to

block publication

serious findings concerning the

modus

and the commission's unequivocal emphasis on the culpa-

of successive National Party governments and

its

all-too-willing surrogates in

every sector of South African society.

For President Mandela, the responses the report elicited, especially from the ANC,
must have been especially disappointing. He devoted the better part of his presidency to
trying to bring about reconciliation between blacks and whites, often to the point where
he was criticized by some blacks for paying more attention to ameliorating the fears of
whites than with ameliorating the inequities blacks had suffered.

But President Mandela wanted
to settle scores or

to put in place the foundation stones for a nation, not

seek retribution. The

here and now. Reconciliation

is

TRC

has not brought about reconciliation in the

a process, not an instantaneous epiphany.

once-over, an ending to something, a closing of the books. Rather,

it is

It is

not a

the beginning of

something new, the opening of a new book that can only grow out of a process

that

begins with catharsis, engenders anger, invites recrimination, leads to reflection, genuflects to the

need for acknowledgment, provides the road

map

for the

way

to healing,

again a painful exploration, and reconciliation, again not a final closing of the wounds,
but a mutual tending to each other's wounds.

When

he

retires

from

office

sometime next

year,
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Mandela

will leave a

South Africa

of contradictions, with enormous social and political challenges to overcome, a

full

South Africa

still

in the

woods, not yet one

in

process of transformation, a South Africa not yet out of the

which democracy has

fully taken root, although the vine is ripen-

ing.

one were to finger the greatest

If

come down

to

Mandela

failure of the

something very simple: the

ANC

Indeed, the nature and dimensions of the task

almost overnight from liberation movement

itself,

to

years,

would perhaps

it

simply underestimated the task
requiring that

transform

it

it

faced.

itself

government were overwhelming, and

the

ANC, not surprisingly, was unable to deliver on the promises it had made to the people.
And it learned, too, that the learning curve is steep. As a result many blacks became
disappointed with the government, and in time that disappointment has turned to some
disillusionment.

According to recent surveys,

this is

not going to result in African voters voting for

another party in the 1999 elections.. There

wish

in effect

is

no other

party.

to register their disapproval, will express their disillusionment

resulting in a lower voter turnout.

The drop

in voter turnout

will

Voters, if they

by staying

at

home,

be the significant

indicator of blacks' dissatisfaction with government, not the percentage of the vote the

ANC

receives.

Even though

it

has enjoyed an overwhelming majority in Parliament, the

supersensitive to criticism, seeing
tion that blacks simply aren't

has bred hubris

up

— a propensity

it

as racially motivated,

to the task

who draw

is

of governing. This hypersensitivity in turn

to dismiss all criticism, justified or not,

response that everything that has gone wrong
heid," and that whites

ANC

and a thinly veiled insinua-

is

somehow

an axiomatic

linked to the "legacy of apart-

attention to such things are apartheid fellow-travelers

in drag.

Indeed, so convincing did this morally unanswerable response

become

for every

government succumbed to its own propaganda. In such circumstances
there was no need for accountability. The ANC merely trots out the apartheid mantra,
and tells the opposition to go stuff it.
Because Parliament is so firmly under the thumb of the ANC, government is immune
from criticism from ANC MPs. There are, of course, free-spirited and open debate, and
failure that the

ongoing clash of personalities; some of the most policy-directed exchanges come from

ANC portfolio committees whose ANC members frequently cross swords with other
ANC members and express whatever opinions they want to. But there is no faulting of
the

ANC. Never hand ammunition

to the apartheid opposition.

The

fact that all

mem-

bers of the opposition have abandoned any form of apartheid or ceased to be advocates

on

its

If

behalf

ANC

is irrelevant.

members

find fault with

cisms through party structures

government

actions, they

— behind closed doors. Public

"behavior bringing the party into disrepute" and the

must channel

their criti-

criticism is equated with

critic is subject to "disciplinary

measures."

Although not by any measure a one-party

state,

South Africa

the foreseeable future, a one-party dominant democracy.

thing during a period of transition

mental and radical reform

when

at all levels

the government

of society

in

Nor
is

and

is,

will

remain for

necessarily a bad

is this

called on to engineer funda-

order to undo the apartheid arrange-

ments, attitudes, structures, and social/public/cultural hierarchies that permeated the
country's fabric.

But whatever disillusionment blacks may

feel,

725

it

never extends

to

Mandela

himself.
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above reproach. Even

is

in matters that properly fall within his

domain,

if things

way blacks expect them to, they criticize the government, but never
Mandela. Blacks make a very clear distinction between Mandela and the government.
Whites do not. Indeed, it often seems they go to the opposite extreme: everything that is
and among whites the litany is almost endless
they
found wanting in government
don't work out the

—

put at the doorstep of Mandela.

Though he

is

the

way

in

— perhaps more

revered abroad, whites

have never warmed

to

Mandela. They

may

accurately,

—
older whites —

respect him, have a grudging admiration for

which he has destigmatized South Africa

may

in the international arena; they

which he is received in other countries to the
degree that the acclaim reflects favorably on South Africa; they may even have grown
fond of him as he edges toward retirement, but there is nothing about him that would
impel them to refer to him as Madiba, or even affectionately as the "old man."
And for all his efforts to assuage their fears, to assure them that their remaining in
take pride, perhaps, in the acclaim with

South Africa

is

crucial to the country's future, that they too are as African as their black

country brethren, they have responded to his courting with wariness.
lously disparaged the increasing

number of whites emigrating

The day he queru-

as not being real South

Africans willing to stand their ground, as being "on the chicken run," and echoed Thabo

Mbeki's "good riddance, "they

he had dropped the facade, and that for once, he

felt that

— and by extension

was revealing his true feelings
whites. Which, if one considers

the true feelings of blacks

— toward

most consuming fear a few years earlier had
been that once blacks "took over" they would turn on whites and treat them in the same
way whites had treated blacks for decades, might be regarded as a giant leap forward.

The Mandela Legacy
Mandela

man

is

spirit,

that their

(1)

the country's founding icon, the

a leader

who

embodiment of

never forgot where he came from

all that is

—a

noble in the hu-

He

prison.

gives black

people a profound sense of pride, something they had never experienced; he imbues

them with a dignity that allows them to rise above the often miserable conditions under
which they live; he freed them from the oppression they had imposed upon themselves

— the oppression of self-imposed victimhood, the excuse for refusing
self.

Every nation

that

sonal and accompanied by conflict and carnage, needs

what

empower

one-

the sacrifices

were

some one person

to

embody

freedom was about; people need a personal

that struggle for an elusiveness called

embodiment of what

to

emerges out of the vicissitudes of historical forces, often imper-

for,

especially

when

the benefits of

freedom are

themselves both elusive and often illusory.

One

must, therefore,

make

The Mandela Legacy

Mandela
ANC-led government.

a distinction between the performance of

president of South Africa and the performance of the

(2)

Mbeki, the deputy president, must step into the shoes of a
to

fill.

Mbeki himself would be among

the

first to

impossible to define, impossible not to recognize.

Four questions
•

What

is

the

as

arise.

Mandela legacy?
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admit

man whose

this.

shoes are too big

Greatness

is

an intangible:

•
•

•

What is the state of the nation Mbcki will inherit?
What stale is the psyche of the country in?
What must Mbeki do to address the manifold problems the country
faces, not all of which arc of its own making, and not all of which can
be dealt with by the actions of a sovereign nation when globalization
has curtailed freedom of unilateral action on the part of sovereign
nations, and

more important

its

when sovereign nations,
many respects,
the global chess game?

efficacy;

especially the smaller and less powerful ones, are, in
spectators at rather than participants in

And

finally,

what context must be used

to evaluate

South Africa's successes or

fail-

ures in the future?

This addendum

is

hardly the place to examine these questions in detail, but they

present the broad parameters of the kinds of questions that would engage us as

we

get a

better understanding of the kinds of travails that societies emerging into the sunlight of

democracy have

to put to themselves.

In the Philippines,

amid

Cory Aquino's "people's revolution" spluttered and collapsed

the institutional corruption that characterizes

much

of Filipino society. The land

barons tenaciously opposed agrarian reform. Aquino, under the benevolent custody of

General Ramos, the army chief of

Ramos succeeded Aquino

from Ramos. The elections

spent

staff,

as president,

attracted

and

little

much of her

in 1998,

attention.

minutes on the world stage, and had the good grace

time dodging coup attempts;

Joseph Erap Estrada took over

The
to

Filipinos

bow

had had

their fifteen

The

out gracefully.

late

Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda, she of the two thousand pairs of shoes, continue

and after nearly ten years it seems the $850 million recovered
from Marcos's kleptocracy will be split, with 75 percent going to the government and

to fascinate the populace,

25 percent

to the

Marcos

in Filipino society

more honored

in

and

family,

who

campaign promises

policies rather than in

still

maintain a powerful and entrenched position

politics. In short, little

has changed, and democracy

is

often

up the mess," promises of "pro-poor"
parliamentary process. But the economy, although battered by the
to "clean

crisis, weathered the financial storms to a far more successful degree
many of its more highly touted neighbors, which perhaps illustrates the maxim that
when you have little to lose, you are in a far better position to be resilient in the face of

Asian financial
than

adversity.

Closer

still

to

ground zero are the Mozambicans, who share the distinction with

Bangladesh of being number one

in

terms of the World Misery Index. Yet

plods on, stoicism born of ineffable suffering. You can

still

Mozambique

buy off a customs guard

with a copy of Playboy magazine, though one often wonders

who

is

getting the better of

the deal.
In local elections in June 1998, the

two major opposition

parties,

RENAMO

and the

United Democratic Movement, called a boycott. Only 15 percent of the eligible voters
cast ballots.

The most

notable result

was

the

emergence of informal

civil society

that successfully contested these elections supporting independent candidates. In

parts of the country, including Maputo, they

amassed over 30 percent of the

groups

some

vote.

FRELIMO, which has been in power for more than twenty-three years, nineteen of
which were spent ruling in a one-party state, is seen by the other parties as the "ruling
legisparty" and the state, since all organs of authority at all branches of government
lative, executive, and judicial
remain firmly within its jurisdiction.. There is little

—

—
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confidence in the political system on the part of the opposition parties.

Assembly

Elections for president and the National

holding his or her breath, least of

all

will

be held

Elections are also due to take place in South Africa in 1999.

ANC

is

that

it

for the

ANC

is that fast

losing support at an even

consolidate

its

No

one

is

The bad news

for the

appears to be losing support, hardly surprising given the levels of unem-

ployment and crime and the spillover

good news

in 1999.

the opposition parties.

as

effects of the
it is

more alarming

Asian

losing support,

rate.

African base, old enemies, the

ANC

For the

ANC

on the economy. The

crisis
all

opposition parties are

a win-win situation. To

it is

and the IFP, are talking a voluntary

honor for Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi,

coalition with a deputy presidency or a like

head of the IFP and for years during the struggle the ANC's personification of collaboration with the apartheid regime.

When

the

TRC

found that Chief Buthelezi was indeed

a state collaborator and behind hit squads that targeted the
the

ANC pooh-poohed

grand alliance.

De

the commission's findings and

Klerk, of course,

is

ANC

in the

went ahead with

1980s and 1990s,
its

gone, pilloried in the end by his

having sold them out. The National Party,

now renamed

the

New

plans for a

own people

for

National Party, has

imploded, and the diminishing white vote has nowhere to go, except perhaps,

like

much

else in white South Africa, to the oblivion of political irrelevance.

As we go

to press, the

New

National Party and the Democratic Party, a party of

white liberals, have gone to court, charging that the government's requirement that
voters cannot vote unless they are in possession of a bar-coded

ID

card,

which they

claim millions of blacks do not possess and are thus being disenfranchised. Unless resolved, the matter could delay the elections.

There are many ways of looking

at the

changes taking place

under discussion. Each way will yield a different

set

in the three countries

of conclusions, because each be-

gins from a different set of starting points.

What is perceived as a learning curve by some is labeled mismanagement by others.
The constant emphasis on consultation is dismissed as indecision by some, as a necessary component of nation building by others. What is harshly condemned as corruption
by some is excused as an almost obligatory sense of duty by others.
Traditions clash; values differ; notions of civil society vary; deference to authority

by some and overemphasized by others.
short, none of the countries lend themselves

rejected
In
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to

easy definition.
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